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Abstract 
Research on intertemporal judgments and choices between a smaller-sooner and a larger-later 
outcome has revealed many anomalies to the discounted-utility model. Attempts to account 
for these anomalies within the discounting paradigm have resulted in convoluted and 
psychologically opaque models. We therefore develop a new model of intertemporal choice, 
the tradeoff model, in which choice results from a tradeoff between the perceived time 
difference (interval) and the perceived outcome difference (compensation). This model is both 
more parsimonious and more intuitive than any rival discounting model of comparable scope. 
Moreover, it accurately describes archival data as well as data from a new experiment. 
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Most choices involve tradeoffs between outcomes occurring at different times. 
Examples include deciding whether to party or work, eat or diet, and spend or invest. These 
are intertemporal choices. Much research has been devoted to observing these choices, and 
finding ways to model them. Many of the preference patterns revealed by this research are 
‘anomalies’ to a normative standard derived from economics. In turn, these anomalies have 
been addressed by developing variants of the normative model. Most of these variants are, 
like the normative model itself, delay-discounting models: A value is assigned to each 
outcome, this value is discounted as a function of the delay to the outcome, and the option 
with the highest discounted value is chosen. Very influential delay-discounting models are 
Samuelson’s (1937) discounted-utility model, commonly seen as the normative standard for 
intertemporal choices, and the model of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), which accounts for 
many preference patterns that are anomalous to the discounted-utility model. 
Delay-discounting models belong to the broad class of alternative-based choice 
models, in which an overall value is assigned to each option and the option with the highest 
value is chosen. Another class is that of attribute-based choice models, in which options are 
compared along their attributes and the option favored by the comparisons is chosen (Payne, 
Bettman & Johnson, 1988).1 The formal modeling of attribute-based choice processes has a 
long tradition in psychology (e.g., González-Vallejo, 2002; Restle, 1961; Tversky, 1969), but 
it has never been undertaken for intertemporal choice. 
In this paper, we develop and apply an attribute-based model of intertemporal choice, 
which we call the tradeoff model. The thrust of this model is that intertemporal tradeoffs are 
not made implicitly, by computing and comparing discounted values, but explicitly, by 
weighing perceived time differences against perceived outcome differences.2 We show that 
the tradeoff model is both more parsimonious and more intuitive than any rival discounting 
model of comparable scope. 
We begin with the basics of discounting theory. We then describe the anomalous 
preference patterns that have been observed and how they have been explained within the 
discounting paradigm. Subsequently, we develop the tradeoff model and apply it to archival 
data as well as data from a new experiment. We end with a discussion of the relation between 
the tradeoff model and other models of choice based on tradeoffs between attribute 
differences, the relation between the tradeoff model and bilinear choice models (among which 
discounting models), and the scope of the tradeoff model within the domain of intertemporal 
choice. 
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Basics of Discounting Theory 
We focus on choices between smaller-sooner (SS) and larger-later (LL) outcomes, such 
as that between $100 in 1 month and $250 in 13 months. The outcomes are designated as xS 
and xL ($100 and $250), and their respective delays as tS and tL (1 and 13 months). According 
to discounting models, intertemporal choices are governed by the discounted values of the two 
options. In delay-discounting models, these are given as 
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where V(x,t) is the value of x given that it will be received after a wait of t, v(x) is the value x 
will have when it is received, and d(t) is a discount factor decreasing in t. Indifference arises 
when SS and LL have equal discounted values, i.e., 
d(tS)v(xS) = d(tL)v(xL). 
The indifference point allows us to derive the discount fraction, which is a measure of the 
discounting over the interval tS → tL: 
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The discount fraction can be interpreted as the value of outcome x after delay tL relative to its 
value after tS. Thus, a higher value of LS ttF →  indicates less discounting. In turn, we can derive 
a one-period discount fraction, which is a measure of the average discounting over the 
interval: 
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where tS and tL are specified in an appropriate unit, usually in years. A higher value of LS tt →δ  
indicates less discounting per unit of time. 
Because the discount function d and the value function v are unknown, researchers 
often define their expectations about intertemporal preferences as deviations from a null 
model that assumes constant discounting of outcomes per unit of time. This model, usually 
called the exponential-discounting model (e.g., Keller & Strazzera, 2002), suggests that, for 
any option pair, indifference between SS and LL arises when L
t
S
t
xx LS δδ = .3 Under the null 
hypothesis, δ is constant across option pairs. Research has shown, however, that δ varies with 
many aspects of the option pairs.4 Within the discounting paradigm, this variation has been 
accommodated in two ways, through modifications of the discount function ttd δ=)(  or the 
value function v(x) = x. 
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Preference Patterns and Discounting Theory 
In this section, we describe the anomalous preference patterns addressed by the 
tradeoff model and show how attempts to account for these patterns within the discounting 
paradigm have proved unsatisfactory. 
Delay effect. A preference pattern that has been the focus of many investigations is the 
‘delay effect’ (Thaler, 1981), which is that a later outcome is discounted less per unit of time 
than an earlier one (i.e., δ increases with t) or, equivalently, that there is less discounting over 
a later interval than over an earlier one of the same length (i.e., δ increases when tS and tL 
increase by the same additive constant a).5 For instance, someone who is indifferent between 
$100 now and $110 in 1 month will prefer $110 in 12 months to $100 in 11 months: There is 
more discounting over the first month than over the twelfth. 
The usual way to account for the delay effect is by modifying the discount function. 
Actually, there is considerable, perhaps remarkable (e.g., Rubinstein, 2003), agreement among 
psychologists and economists that the notion of exponential discounting should be replaced by 
some form of hyperbolic discounting (Ainslie, 1975, 1991), in which δ increases with the 
delay to an outcome, or quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997), also called present-
biased preferences (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999), in which δ is lower when the interval 
separating the outcomes begins now than when it begins later (an instance of the delay effect 
that is called the immediacy effect; see Read, Loewenstein, & Kalyanaraman, 1999). A general 
formulation of hyperbolic discounting has been given by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992): 
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where β > 0 is the degree of discounting and α > 0 is the departure from exponential 
discounting. Given this discount function, the discount fraction for the interval tS → tL is 
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Thus, there is more discounting over a longer interval than over a shorter one, because 
LS tt
F →  
decreases with tS → tL, and there is less discounting over a later interval than over an earlier 
one of the same length, because 
LS tt
F →  increases when tS and tL increase by the same amount 
of time. Because, in the latter case, tL - tS does not change, there is also less discounting per 
unit of time, i.e., 
LS tt →
δ  increases. 
Because the delay effect is the only preference pattern in which δ varies strictly with 
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the delay to an outcome, it is also the only preference pattern that can be easily accommodated 
by modifying the discount function. The two preference patterns discussed next, in which δ 
also varies with characteristics of the outcome itself, require more extensive modifications of 
discounting theory. 
Magnitude effect. The ‘magnitude effect’ (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991) is that a larger 
outcome is discounted less than a smaller one of the same sign (i.e., δ increases with the 
magnitude of x) or, equivalently, there is less discounting over an interval when the magnitude 
of the outcomes increases by the same factor (i.e., δ increases when the magnitude of xS and 
xL increases by the same multiplicative constant m). For instance, someone who is indifferent 
between $100 now and $110 in 1 month will prefer $1,100 in one month to $1,000 now. The 
magnitude effect has been addressed in two different ways. 
The magnitude effect has often been ascribed to the discount function (e.g., Green, 
Myerson, & McFadden, 1997; Kirby, 1997; Kirby & Maraković, 1996). This solution is 
unsatisfactory from a formal standpoint, because it sacrifices the separability of delay and 
outcome in a psychophysical model: The discounted value of a delayed outcome is now given 
as 
V(x,t) = d(x,t)v(x). 
More importantly, however, the solution is unsatisfactory from a psychological perspective, 
because the question “Why is a larger outcome discounted less than a smaller one?” receives 
the answer “Because it is larger.” Loewenstein (1988), opposing such a development, argued 
that postulating different discount curves for different types of consumption (e.g., smoking, 
drinking, eating), “would collapse the concept of discounting to a tautology.” (p. 212) This 
argument seems even more valid for different amounts of consumption of the same thing. 
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) ascribe the magnitude effect to the value function 
rather than the discount function. Their value function has three properties that are familiar 
from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991): Reference 
dependence (outcomes are evaluated as gains and losses relative to a neutral reference point), 
diminishing sensitivity (the marginal impact of an outcome decreases as the magnitude of the 
outcome increases), and loss aversion (losses loom larger than gains). The dashed value 
function in Figure 1 has these properties. The magnitude effect is accommodated by a fourth 
property: The contrast between the more curved regions near the reference point and the less 
curved regions away from the reference point is greater than in prospect theory. The solid 
value function in Figure 1 has this property as well. 
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------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
A formal definition of the fourth property is increasing proportional sensitivity (Prelec 
& Loewenstein, 1991): Augmenting the outcomes by the same multiplicative constant 
augments the value of the larger outcome relative to the value of the smaller one, or 
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For instance, the percentage by which the value of $110 exceeds that of $100 is greater than 
the percentage by which the value of $11 exceeds that of $10.7 An equivalent definition is that 
the elasticity of the value function increases with outcome magnitude (Loewenstein & Prelec, 
1992). 
While the elasticity property accommodates the magnitude effect, it has not been 
invoked as an explanatory device by other theories of judgment and choice, so that its 
epistemic appeal seems rather restricted. 
Sign effect. The ‘sign effect’ (Thaler, 1981) is that a loss is discounted less than a gain 
of the same magnitude (i.e., δ is higher when x > 0 than when x < 0).8 For instance, someone 
who is indifferent between gaining $100 now and gaining $110 in one month will rather lose 
$100 now than lose $110 in one month. 
The sign effect is accommodated by a fifth property of Loewenstein and Prelec’s 
(1992) value function: The section above the reference point is more curved than the section 
below it (see Figure 1). A formal definition of this property is loss amplification (Prelec & 
Loewenstein, 1991): Changing the outcomes from gains to losses has the same effect as 
increasing their magnitude by the same multiplicative constant, or 
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An equivalent definition is that the value function is more elastic for losses than for gains 
(Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992). 
Loss amplification, or a greater elasticity for losses than for gains, identifies an 
interaction between loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity, in that sensitivity to losses 
diminishes less than sensitivity to gains. However, such an interaction has not been invoked as 
an explanatory device by other theories of judgment and choice. Rather, loss aversion and 
diminishing sensitivity are usually viewed as independent properties of the value function. 
The tradeoff model developed in this paper accounts for the sign effect on the basis of loss 
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aversion alone, not in interaction with diminishing sensitivity.9 
Rescheduling effect. In many studies, the sign effect is either confounded with or 
eclipsed by another preference pattern, which is that a gain is discounted more, and a loss is 
discounted less, when it is postponed from tS to tL than when it is ‘preponed’ over the same 
interval.10 We call this effect, originally described by Loewenstein (1988), the ‘rescheduling 
effect.’ 
Imagine one is entitled to receive $100 immediately but is given the opportunity to 
receive it in 1 month along with some compensation for postponing it. Suppose one demands 
$10 in compensation. Now imagine that one is entitled to receive $110 in 1 month but is given 
the opportunity to receive the money right now and pay a compensation for preponing it. How 
much would one be willing to pay in compensation? In the first scenario, the equivalent of 
$110 in 1 month is $100 now, so one should be willing to pay $10 in the second scenario as 
well. However, the rescheduling effect is that one would offer less than $10 in compensation. 
Thus, δ is lower when a gain is postponed than when it is preponed over the same interval. 
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) ascribe the rescheduling effect to reference 
dependence and loss aversion. On the one hand, when a gain is postponed, the smaller-sooner 
gain is not evaluated as a gain; rather, foregoing the smaller-sooner gain is evaluated as a loss. 
The larger-later gain, which must compensate for this loss, is evaluated as a gain. Thus, the 
compensation demanded for postponing the gain has two components: A compensation for the 
delay (the discounting component) and a compensation for the loss (the loss-aversion 
component). The greater the discounting and the greater the loss aversion, the larger the 
compensation demanded. Therefore, when a gain is postponed, both components work in the 
same direction, toward a lower δ. 
On the other hand, when a gain is preponed, foregoing the larger-later gain is 
evaluated as a loss, whereas the smaller-sooner gain is evaluated as a gain. In this case, 
discounting and loss aversion work in opposite directions: The greater the discounting, the 
larger the compensation offered; the greater the loss aversion, the smaller the compensation 
offered. Thus, discounting decreases δ, whereas loss aversion increases it. Overall, δ will be 
lower when a gain is postponed than when it is preponed over the same interval. 
In Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) model, the sign effect is ascribed to the 
asymmetric elasticity of the value function, whereas the rescheduling effect, which is 
basically a sign effect for compensations, is ascribed to the asymmetric steepness of the value 
function: Compensations to be paid loom larger than compensations to be received. This need 
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to explain very similar phenomena with very different devices poses a threat to the parsimony 
of Loewenstein and Prelec’s model, as well as other comprehensive discounting models of 
intertemporal choice. Indeed, the tradeoff model developed in this paper accounts for both 
phenomena (the sign effect and the rescheduling effect) on the basis of loss aversion. 
Although the four preference patterns discussed above can be addressed by modifying 
delay-discounting models, other patterns cannot. These patterns, which are called ‘interval 
effects’ (Scholten & Read, 2006), require a more drastic revision of the discounting paradigm. 
Interval effects. Imagine we divide an interval, e.g., tS → tL, into a series of shorter, 
contiguous intervals, e.g., tS → tM and tM → tL. For instance, we divide one day into morning 
and afternoon. Now imagine two procedures. In the first, we obtain separate measures of δ for 
the morning and the afternoon and then combine them into a single measure. In the second, 
we obtain a single measure of δ directly for the whole day. Delay-discounting models suggest 
that the two procedures should yield the same result. Expressed in terms of discount fractions, 
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Even when allowing for outcome dependence of the discount factors, i.e., d(x,t), the different 
procedures should yield the same result. Recent studies, however, have shown that this does 
not occur (Baron, 2000; Read, 2001; Read & Roelofsma, 2003; Roelofsma & Read, 2000; 
Scholten & Read, 2006). 
The overall conclusion that can be drawn from these studies is that there is usually 
more discounting when an interval is divided into a series of shorter intervals than when it is 
left undivided (subadditivity), but that there is less discounting when an interval is divided 
into a series of very short intervals (superadditivity). More formally, consider the average 
discounting over a series of intervals: 
n
n
i i
n ∏
=
=
1
)( δδ , 
where n is the number of intervals into which an interval is divided. If m > n, subadditivity 
occurs when δ (m) < δ (n), whereas superaddivity occurs when δ (m) > δ (n). Equivalently, if we 
aggregate short intervals into longer ones, these longer intervals into still longer ones, and so 
forth, δ (n) will decrease and then increase (see Scholten & Read, 2006, Figure 2). 
Interval effects suggest that the discounting over an interval is not only a function of 
the delay to the outcomes, but also of the delay between them (see Footnote 5). Recently, 
interval effects have been accommodated by a generalization of Loewenstein and Prelec’s 
(1992) delay-discounting model. In Scholten and Read’s (2006) interval-discounting model, 
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the discounted values of SS and LL are given as 
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so that indifference arises when 
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where v is a value function with the five properties discussed earlier, and D is an interval-
discount function. Specifically, D is a generalization of Loewenstein and Prelec’s (1992) 
delay-discount function: 
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where β > 0 is the degree of discounting and α > 0, ϑ > 1, and 0 < τ < 1 are departures from 
exponential discounting, indicating subadditivity, superadditivity, and diminishing sensitivity 
to delays, respectively. 
The interval-discounting model achieves a gain in scope, but this comes with a loss in 
psychological plausibility. The model basically proposes a combination of alternative-based 
and attribute-based choice: A discounted value is assigned to each option and the option with 
the highest value is chosen (alternative-based choice), but, to obtain the discounted values, the 
options are directly compared along the time attribute (attribute-based choice). Although the 
interval-discounting model is not unique in combining both choice modes (e.g., Mellers & 
Biagini, 1994; Shafir, Osherson, & Smith, 1993), it is unique in proposing that the options are 
compared along one attribute (time) but not along the other (outcome). The question arises 
why the outcome attribute should be treated any differently from the time attribute: Why not 
directly compare the options along the outcome attribute as well? This question is the point of 
departure for the development of the tradeoff model. 
Development of the Tradeoff Model 
The tradeoff model addresses intertemporal judgments and choices that involve a 
comparison between a smaller-sooner (SS) and a larger-later (LL) outcome. It focuses on 
situations in which people treat such options ‘dispassionately but intuitively.’ That is, they are 
neither overridden by powerful emotions (e.g., Loewenstein, 1996), nor guided by formal 
reasoning (e.g., Kahneman, 2003). 
The thrust of the tradeoff model is that judgments and choices are made by weighing 
the perceived interval separating the outcomes against the perceived compensation for 
obtaining a gain later rather than sooner or incurring a loss sooner rather than later. This 
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weighing process may be more or less cursory, depending on the options under consideration 
and the task at hand (e.g., matching or choice). The more cursory assessments are procedural, 
whereas the more careful assessments are psychophysical. In this paper, we emphasize the 
psychophysics, but we briefly discuss the procedures as well. 
We use f(tS, tL) > 0 to denote the advantage of the smaller-sooner gain or the larger-
later loss along the time attribute and g(xS, xL) > 0 to denote the advantage of the larger-later 
gain or the smaller-sooner loss along the outcome attribute. Indifference between SS and LL 
arises when 
),(),( LSLS xxgttf = .                                               (1) 
Preference for the larger-later gain or the smaller-sooner loss arises when g(xS, xL) > f(tS, tL). 
We will systematically develop this model, starting with its most elementary specification. 
Intra-attribute subtractivity 
In the simplest formulation of the tradeoff model, the advantage of one option along 
the time attribute is weighted against the advantage of the other option along the outcome 
attribute by a single tradeoff parameter: 
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where κ > 0. Thus, an advantage is given by the absolute difference between the options along 
an attribute (intra-attribute subtractivity; cf. Tversky & Krantz, 1970). The tradeoff parameter 
κ reflects the units in which the delays and the outcomes are measured (e.g., when changing 
days into weeks, κ increases sevenfold) as well as the rate at which time differences are traded 
off against outcome differences (e.g., when doubling the compensation demanded or offered 
for each additional week, κ is also doubled). 
The one-parameter model in Equation 2 accounts for two robust preference patterns. 
The first, a shared implication of normative and descriptive models, is that increasing both 
delays by the same multiplicative constant changes indifference into preference for SS (gains) 
or LL (losses). The second pattern is the magnitude effect: Increasing the magnitude of both 
outcomes by the same multiplicative constant changes indifference into preference for LL 
(gains) or SS (losses). According to the tradeoff model, the multiplicative constant increases 
the difference between the options along the time or outcome attribute, thus increasing the 
impact of that attribute. 
Reference dependence and loss aversion 
Like prospect theory, the tradeoff model assumes reference dependence and constant 
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loss aversion (see Tversky & Kahneman, 1991): Each outcome is evaluated as a gain or a loss 
relative to a neutral reference point and changing an outcome from a gain to a loss increases 
its perceived magnitude by a multiplicative constant. The implications of loss aversion depend 
on what the reference point is. 
Sign effect. If the reference point is current wealth, gains and losses coincide with the 
actual amounts to be received or paid (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In this case, indifference 
between SS and LL arises when 

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where Λ > 1 is the loss-aversion parameter. Loss aversion gives rise to the sign effect: 
Changing both outcomes from gains to losses changes indifference into preference for SS, 
because Λ increases the perceived difference between the options along the outcome attribute, 
thus increasing the impact of that attribute. 
Rescheduling effect. The above derivation of the sign effect applies only if both 
outcomes are evaluated as deviations from current wealth. However, the reference point may 
be affected by the formulation of the options and by the expectations of the decision maker 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Specifically, one of the options may be designated as an 
entitlement (a right to receive x at t) or a commitment (a responsibility to pay x at t), and the 
other as an option that includes a compensation for rescheduling x. In this case, it is natural to 
treat the entitlement or commitment as the default. As a result of adaptation to the default, the 
reference point may shift away from current wealth. By how much the reference point will 
shift, however, is unclear. 
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) assumed complete adaptation to an entitlement or a 
commitment. When specifying, for instance, the minimum to be received at tL to forego a 
receipt at tS, the outcomes are evaluated as a gain of xL at tL and a loss of xS at tS (see also 
Shelley, 1993). Thus, receiving xL is evaluated as a gain relative to current wealth, whereas 
foregoing xS is evaluated as a loss relative to a reference point that has shifted away to current 
wealth plus the entitlement. 
There is the theoretical possibility, however, that adaptation varies anywhere between 
one extreme case of no adaptation and the other extreme case of complete adaptation. Indeed, 
the possibility of incomplete adaptation has also been considered by Loewenstein and others 
(Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991; Strahilevitz & Loewenstein, 1998). Incomplete adaptation 
implies that foregoing xS would not be as bad as a total loss of xS. Figure 2 depicts the 
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implications of rescheduling an entitlement if there is no adaptation, if there is complete 
adaptation, and if there is, as we propose, incomplete adaptation.11 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
In Figure 2, xS denotes an entitlement and Lxˆ denotes the outcome that compensates 
for rescheduling the entitlement. The top left panel shows no adaptation, the case described by 
Equation 3. Both xS and Lxˆ  are evaluated as deviations from current wealth, the origin of the 
value function. The top right panel shows complete adaptation. Receiving xS is evaluated as a 
neutral outcome, the origin of the dashed value function, whereas foregoing xS is evaluated as 
a loss. Loss aversion implies that the relief from not losing xS is greater than the pleasure of 
gaining xS, so that, when holding tL and tS constant, Lxˆ  is larger than in the case of no 
adaptation. The bottom panel shows incomplete adaptation. Receiving xS is evaluated as a 
gain of xS - RS, while foregoing xS is evaluated as a loss of RS. This case is less extreme than 
that of no adaptation (RS = 0) and complete adaptation (RS = xS), so that Lxˆ  is less extreme as 
well. 
Applying the above reasoning to all four rescheduling scenarios, we arrive at the 
following specification of the tradeoff model: 
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Because the above reference-point model assumes a linear value function, it can be given as 
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Thus, the compensation that one wants to receive for postponing a gain or preponing a loss, or 
that one is willing to pay for preponing a gain or postponing a loss, can be broken down into a 
component that reflects the weighing of the compensation against the interval over which the 
rescheduling occurs and a component that reflects the reluctance to accept the compensation, 
which results from adaptation. Equation 4 reduces to Equation 3 when there is no adaptation, 
i.e., when RS = RL = 0. 
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To derive the rescheduling effect for gains, we solve Equation 4.1 for Lxˆ : 
SSSLL Rxttx )1()(ˆ −Λ++−= κ . 
This is the minimum that one wants to receive at tL in exchange for xS at tS. Substituting Lxˆ  
for xL in Equation 4.3 and solving for Sxˆ , 
))(1(ˆ LSSS RRxx +−Λ+= . 
This is the minimum that one wants to receive at tS in exchange for Lxˆ  at tL. It is evident that 
SS xx >ˆ  as long as there is loss aversion and adaptation. In a similar fashion, the rescheduling 
effect for losses can be derived from Equations 4.2 and 4.4. 
Conclusion. The tradeoff model offers a parsimonious and psychologically plausible 
explanation of the sign effect and the rescheduling effect: Loss aversion is the common cause 
of both, while the degree of adaptation to a rescheduled outcome determines the degree to 
which the sign effect is outweighed by the rescheduling effect. Although this explanation of 
the rescheduling effect is conceptually simple, the formal specification of the tradeoff model 
becomes quite complex, as evident from Equation 4. Therefore, we will discuss the remaining 
properties of our model without the complicating factor of rescheduling. 
Diminishing sensitivity 
Equation 3 implies that the impact of an attribute will not change when the attribute 
amounts change by the same additive constant. For instance, the difference between 1 and 2 
months (or $1 and $2) would have the same impact as that between 11 and 12 months (or $11 
and $12). This is at odds with the principle of diminishing sensitivity (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1991), which has its roots in the Weber-Fechner law. The principle states that sensitivity to a 
given difference between attribute amounts decreases as the distance of the attribute amounts 
from the reference point increases. The tradeoff model incorporates diminishing sensitivity to 
both delays and outcomes. We remove the assumption that delays and outcomes are treated 
objectively by the decision maker, and propose that the tradeoff is between perceived intervals 
and perceived compensations: 
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where w is a delay-perception function and v is a value function. Subjective delays are 
positive deviations from the present, i.e., w(t) ≥ 0 for t ≥ 0, they increase with objective 
delays, i.e., w´(t) > 0, but at a decreasing rate, i.e., w´´(t) < 0. Correspondingly, subjective 
outcomes are either positive or negative deviations from current wealth, i.e., v(x) ≥ 0 for x ≥ 0 
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and v(x) < 0 for x < 0, their subjective magnitude increases with their objective magnitude, 
i.e., v´(x) > 0, but at a decreasing rate, i.e., v´´(x) < 0 for x ≥ 0 and v´´(x) > 0 for x < 0.12 In 
addition, a loss is perceived to be greater than a gain of equal magnitude, i.e., v(-x) = -Λv(x) 
for x ≥ 0. 
Diminishing sensitivity accounts for two preference patterns. The first, a shared 
implication of normative and descriptive models, is that increasing the magnitude of the 
outcomes by the same additive constant changes indifference into preference for SS (gains) or 
LL (losses). The second pattern is the delay effect: Increasing the delays by the same additive 
constant changes indifference into preference for LL (gains) or SS (losses). According to the 
tradeoff model, the additive constant decreases the perceived difference between the options 
along the time or outcome attribute, thus decreasing the impact of that attribute. 
Diminishing sensitivity also attenuates the extremely large effects generated by intra-
attribute subtractivity. The linear model in Equation 3 implies, for instance, that someone who 
is indifferent between $1 sooner and $11 later should also be indifferent between $100 sooner 
and $110 later, because xL - xS = $10 in both cases. This is an extremely large magnitude 
effect, because the person is sensitive only to absolute differences between the options, and 
not at all to proportional differences. In case of any sensitivity to proportional differences, the 
person would prefer $100 sooner to $110 later. To restore indifference, the later outcome 
would have to be larger than $110, i.e., xL - xS increases as xS increases. Because of the 
magnitude effect, however, it would not have to be as large as $1,100, i.e., (xL - xS) / xS 
decreases as xS increases. The combination of diminishing sensitivity and intra-attribute 
subtractivity, as described by the nonlinear model in Equation 5, yields this pattern. 
To see the generality of the result that diminishing sensitivity attenuates the effects 
generated by intra-attribute subtractivity, let x and y be the sooner outcomes (in the above 
example, x = 1 and y = 100), let a be the amount added to both x and y (in the example, a = 
10), and let e be the extra amount added to y. Holding tS and tL constant, indifference among 
each pair of options implies that 
v(x + a) – v(x) = v(y + a + e) – v(y). 
Rearrangement of the terms yields 
v(y) – v(x) = v(y + a + e) – v(x + a).                                      (6) 
The concavity of the value function v implies that 
v(y) – v(x) > v(y + a) – v(x + a). 
In Equation 6, then, it must be true that e > 0. How large e should be to restore indifference 
depends on the specific shape of the value function v, to be discussed when we apply our 
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model to actual data. 
Augmenting and diminishing relative sensitivity 
In a general sense, any formal model of intertemporal choice proposes a weighing of 
delays and outcomes within some theoretical structure. For clarity of exposition, we draw a 
distinction between two types of weighing functions in the tradeoff model. On the one hand, 
the intra-attribute weighing functions: These are the delay-perception function w, which 
weighs delays against one another, and the value function v, which weighs outcomes against 
one another. On the other hand, there is an inter-attribute weighing function, which weighs 
perceived intervals against perceived compensations. In Equation 5, this is a scalar function, 
which multiplies perceived intervals by the tradeoff parameter κ. However, as discussed 
earlier, intertemporal preferences are usually subadditive in intervals. This suggests that, in 
general, the weight of perceived intervals is marginally decreasing relative to the weight of 
perceived compensations (diminishing relative sensitivity). We introduce a tradeoff function 
to capture this: 
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The tradeoff function Q, which includes the tradeoff parameter κ, increases with perceived 
intervals, i.e., Q´(·) > 0, but at a decreasing rate, i.e., Q´´(·) < 0. We emphasize that Q, like κ, 
is strictly comparative: Equation 7 does not imply that the weight of perceived intervals is 
itself marginally decreasing, but only that it is marginally decreasing relative to the weight of 
perceived compensations. 
Although, as discussed earlier, subadditivity is the general rule, it can reverse into 
superadditivity for very short intervals. To capture this, the tradeoff function Q is marginally 
increasing over short perceived intervals, i.e., Q´´(·) > 0, but marginally decreasing over 
longer ones, i.e., Q´´(·) < 0. The marginally increasing weight of short perceived intervals 
(augmenting relative sensitivity) reflects a more general tendency of people to underweight 
small perceived intra-attribute differences, as originally suggested by Tversky’s (1969) 
additive-difference model. 
This completes the development of the tradeoff model. Table 1 draws a comparison 
between the tradeoff model and Scholten and Read’s (2006) interval-discounting model, the 
only discounting model of comparable scope. The tradeoff model is more parsimonious than 
the interval-discounting model, because it replaces the (psychologically implausible) proposal 
of interval discounting with the (more intuitive) principle of intra-attribute subtractivity, and 
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can thereby remove increasing proportional sensitivity and loss amplification as explanatory 
devices. The tradeoff model also has a broader scope than the interval-discounting model, in 
that it allows for incomplete adaptation to rescheduled outcomes. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Applications of the Tradeoff Model 
Indifference data 
According to the tradeoff model, indifference between SS and LL arises when f(tS, tL) = 
g(xS, xL). This raises two issues: How to determine the indifference point and how to estimate 
and evaluate the tradeoff model. 
The indifference point is usually determined by fixing the two delays and one of the 
outcomes, and finding the magnitude of the other (variable) outcome that yields indifference 
between SS and LL. In matching, the magnitude of the variable outcome is specified by the 
participants. In choice-based matching, its magnitude is adjusted in response to each of a 
series of choices until the largest amount that yields preference for one option is sufficiently 
close to the smallest amount that yields preference for the other option. The midpoint between 
those two amounts is usually taken to be the indifference point. We analyze data from both 
types of studies. 
To estimate the tradeoff model, we minimize the sum of squared deviations between 
the observed and predicted values of the dependent variable (which is some function of the 
two delays and the two outcomes at the indifference point) across all option pairs: 
∑
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where yi and iyˆ  are the observed and predicted value, respectively, for option pair i and n is 
the number of option pairs.13 We thus maximize 
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where y  is the average value of yi across the n option pairs. This average is the best ordinary 
least-squares estimate of a constant value y. Thus, R2 compares the predictive accuracy of the 
tradeoff model with that of a null model, according to which yi = y for all i. For this evaluation 
of the tradeoff model to be meaningful, the null model has to be meaningful, which ultimately 
depends on the choice of y. 
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Discounting models have frequently been estimated and evaluated on the variable 
outcomes that yield indifference between SS and LL (e.g., Green et al., 2005; Green et al., 
1997; Kirby, 1997; Murphy et al., 2001; Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991; Scholten & Read, 
2006; Simpson & Vuchinich, 2000). However, when using outcomes as the dependent 
variable, the null model predicts a constant outcome across option pairs, which is an overly 
naïve standard of comparison. First, it fails to predict that larger outcomes are discounted by a 
greater amount than smaller ones (e.g., if $10 is discounted by $5 over a period of time, $100 
will be discounted by more than $5 over that period), as predicted by any discounting 
model.14 Second, it fails to predict that outcomes are discounted by a greater amount over 
longer delays than over shorter ones (e.g., if $10 is discounted by $5 over 1 period of time, 
that outcome will be discounted by more than $5 over 2 periods), as contradicted only by a 
model of “dichotomous time preferences” (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992, p. 580), “in which 
the present outcome has unit weight, and all future events are discounted by a common 
constant.” Thus, when using outcomes as dependent variable, the null model is too easy to 
defeat: Any alternative model can come out favorably by predicting very general discounting 
effects. 
To remove these general discounting effects from model estimation and evaluation, 
the dependent variable should be some indicator of the proportion by which outcomes are 
discounted per unit of time. Such indicators can be derived from the exponential-discounting 
model. According to one formulation of this model, indifference between SS and LL arises 
when LS tL
t
S xx )1/()1/( ρρ +=+ , where ρ > 0 is a one-period discount coefficient. Solving for 
ρ, 
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An equivalent formulation of this model is L
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xx LS δδ = , where 0 < δ < 1 is a one-period 
discount fraction. Solving for δ, 
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The proportion by which the outcomes are discounted per unit of time is ρ / (1 + ρ) = 1 - δ. 
This is the discount rate, which, according to the null model, is constant across outcome pairs. 
The alternative model than predicts that ρ or δ will vary. The predictions of the tradeoff model 
can be obtained by solving Equation 1 for the variable outcome and substituting it into 
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Equation 8 or 9. 
We apply our model to aggregate values of ρ or δ. In the literature, indifference data 
have been aggregated across participants by taking arithmetic means of ρ (e.g., Benzion et al., 
1989), geometric means of ρ (e.g., Chapman, 1996), arithmetic means of δ (e.g., Read & 
Roelofsma, 2003), or geometric means of δ (e.g., Scholten & Read, 2006). We favor the last 
procedure, because it preserves the ratio information in the data: Taking the geometric mean 
of δ is the same as taking the geometric mean of the variable outcome and computing δ from 
there.15 However, our first analysis is conducted on the arithmetic means of ρ reported in a 
highly influential paper by Benzion et al. (1989). The purpose of this analysis is to examine 
the performance of the flexible reference-point model in Equation 4 and to explore whether 
and how the degree of adaptation to the rescheduled outcome varies with its magnitude and 
sign. 
Indifference data from matching 
In the matching study undertaken by Benzion et al. (1989), participants specified, for 
64 option pairs, the magnitude of the variable outcome that yielded indifference between SS 
and LL. Each question was embedded in a scenario that designated the fixed outcome as an 
entitlement or commitment and the variable outcome as a compensation for rescheduling the 
fixed outcome. The 64 option pairs resulted from a 2 (postponing versus preponing) × 2 
(outcome sign) × 4 (outcome magnitude) × 4 (delay to the later outcome) design. The sooner 
outcome was always available immediately, so that the effect of the delay to the later outcome 
(the delay effect) was confounded with the effect of the interval between the sooner and the 
later outcome (subadditivity; see also Footnote 5). Therefore, we will call this the pseudo-
delay effect. The data (Benzion et al., 1989, Table 1) revealed four major preference patterns: 
The rescheduling effect, the sign effect, the magnitude effect, and the pseudo-delay effect. 
We examine the accuracy with which Equation 4 accounts for these data and we 
explore whether and how the degree of adaptation to rescheduled outcomes varies with their 
magnitude and sign. While complete adaptation implies a one-to-one relation between the 
magnitude of the outcomes and the degree of adaptation, incomplete adaptation opens many 
possibilities. For instance, it has been suggested that people adapt more readily to gains than 
to losses of equal magnitude (Strahilevitz & Loewenstein, 1998; Thaler & Johnson, 1990). To 
test for incomplete and asymmetric adaptation, we estimate 2 (outcome sign) × 4 (outcome 
magnitude) = 8 values of R. 
To preserve the computational tractability of the flexible reference-point model in 
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Equation 4, we do not introduce functional forms that capture diminishing sensitivity to 
outcomes and diminishing (relative) sensitivity to delays (perceived intervals).16 Instead, we 
allow the tradeoff parameter κ to vary freely with the magnitude of the rescheduled outcome 
and the delay to the later outcome. We expect the variation of κ to exhibit an orderly pattern, 
because it is supposed to reflect unspecified properties of well-behaved functions, v(x) and 
Q(w(tL)).17 Moreover, we test two hypotheses about how κ varies with outcome magnitude 
and delay. 
First, as discussed earlier, a linear v(x) implies insensitivity to proportional differences 
between outcomes, whereas a concave v(x) yields some degree of proportionality.18 Thus, the 
hypothesis of magnitude dependence is that κ will increase with outcome magnitude. 
Second, if Q(w(tL)) is linear, the perceived compensation for rescheduling is 
proportional to tL. For instance, when a person is indifferent between the options and tL 
doubles, the perceived compensation must increase by a factor 2κ for indifference to be 
maintained. However, if Q(w(tL)) is concave, indifference will be maintained if the perceived 
compensation increases by a factor of less than 2κ. The hypothesis of delay dependence is that 
κ will decrease with delay. A sufficient condition for this to occur is that the combined effect 
of diminishing sensitivity to delay and diminishing relative sensitivity to perceived intervals 
be greater than the effect of diminishing sensitivity to outcomes. 
To test for magnitude and delay dependence, we estimate 4 (outcome magnitude) × 4 
(delay to the later outcome) = 16 values of κ. Combining the eight values of R and the 16 
values of κ with a single value of Λ, we estimated 25 free parameter values from 64 data 
points (one-period discount coefficients). The results are given in Table 2. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
There was evidence of incomplete adaptation to rescheduled outcomes: R was always 
greater (in absolute terms) than zero, but always smaller than the outcome being rescheduled. 
There was also evidence of asymmetric adaptation to gains and losses: For outcomes of $40, 
$200, and $1,000, R was greater (in absolute terms) for gains than for losses, but for outcomes 
of $5,000, this asymmetry reversed (see the top panel of Figure 3). Outcome magnitude and 
sign accounted for 80% and 11%, respectively, of the variation of R on a logarithmic scale, 
their interaction for 9%. 
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------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
There was also evidence of diminishing sensitivity to outcomes and diminishing 
(relative) sensitivity to delays (perceived intervals): κ increased steadily and reliably with 
outcome magnitude (magnitude dependence), and decreased steadily, but not always reliably, 
with the delay to the later outcome (delay dependence). More specifically, κ increased by a 
nearly constant proportion as outcome magnitude increased by a constant proportion; 
conversely, κ decreased by a nearly constant proportion as the delay to the later outcome 
increased by a constant proportion (see the bottom panel of Figure 3). Outcome magnitude 
and delay accounted for 96% and 4%, respectively, of the variation of κ on a logarithmic 
scale, their interaction for virtually nothing. This highly regular variation of κ bolsters our 
confidence in the present estimation of the flexible reference-point model. 
Finally, there was evidence of loss aversion: Λ was reliably greater than one, although 
its magnitude of 1.14 was modest compared with estimates obtained by applying subjectively 
expected value models to risky choices, e.g., Λ = 2.25 (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), and Λ = 
1.43 (Schmidt & Traub, 2002). 
Figure 4 displays the observed and predicted values of ρ. The top panel shows that ρ is 
greater when postponing a gain than when preponing it, but smaller when postponing a loss 
than when preponing it (the rescheduling effect). Also, ρ is greater for gains than for losses 
(the sign effect). The bottom panel shows that ρ is greater for smaller outcomes than for larger 
ones (the magnitude effect) and greater for longer delays than for shorter ones (the pseudo-
delay effect). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
Because the estimated reference-point shifts indicated a tendency to adapt less to gains 
of $5,000 than to losses of equal magnitude, Figure 5 displays observed and predicted values 
of ρ for those outcomes only. Comparison with the overall results in the top panel of Figure 4 
reveals that the rescheduling effect is attenuated for gains of $5,000 but not for losses of equal 
magnitude and that the highest value of ρ no longer occurred for the postponement of gains 
but rather for the preponement of losses. This pattern of results also emerged in a matching 
study by Shelley (1993, Figures 3 and 6), using the same delays and outcomes as Benzion et 
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al. (1989).19 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------- 
In sum, the results from this first application of the tradeoff model suggest that 
adaptation to a rescheduled outcome is incomplete (e.g., an entitlement of $200 yields a 
reference-point shift of less than $200), that adaptation increases with outcome magnitude 
(e.g., an entitlement of $200 yields a greater reference-point shift than an entitlement of $40), 
and that the level of adaptation to gains is generally higher than the level of adaptation to 
losses (e.g., an entitlement of $200 yields a greater reference-point shift than a commitment of 
$200). As outcome magnitude increases, however, adaptation to losses increases at a higher 
rate than adaptation to gains and may eventually reach a higher level. The issue of adaptation 
to a rescheduled outcome deserves greater attention, both empirically and theoretically. 
The results are also indicative of diminishing sensitivity to outcomes and diminishing 
(relative) sensitivity to delays (perceived intervals). Because of the delay-interval confound, it 
was not possible to distinguish between diminishing sensitivity to delays and diminishing 
relative sensitivity to perceived intervals. This will be possible, however, in the second 
application of the tradeoff model. In the next section, therefore, we specify functional forms 
that capture these properties. 
The weighing of delays 
The delay-perception function w has two properties: Reference dependence (with the 
present serving as the reference point) and diminishing sensitivity to delays. Diminishing 
sensitivity has two limits. One is constant sensitivity, in which case subjective time runs at the 
same speed as objective time and w becomes a scalar function, i.e., w(t) = t. The other limit is 
insensitivity, in which case any delay is treated as if it had no duration at all and w becomes a 
zero function i.e., w(t) = 0 for any t. Both reference dependence and diminishing sensitivity 
are incorporated in the following delay-perception function: 
)1log(1)( ttw τ
τ
+= ,                                               (10) 
where τ > 0 is a diminishing-sensitivity parameter. The delay-perception function becomes a 
scalar function, with constant sensitivity, as τ goes to zero and a zero function, with complete 
insensitivity, as τ goes toward infinity. 
The tradeoff function Q has three properties: Augmenting relative sensitivity, 
diminishing relative sensitivity, and a progression of augmenting and diminishing relative 
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sensitivity as intervals increase in perceived length. Either form of relative sensitivity has two 
limits: Constant sensitivity and insensitivity. Letting T = w(tL) - w(tS), 
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where α > 0 reflects diminishing relative sensitivity and Β ≥ 1 reflects augmenting relative 
sensitivity. Figure 6 displays four variants of Q, corresponding to the presence or absence of 
augmenting or diminishing relative sensitivity. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
------------------------------- 
Figure 7 displays the characteristically S-shaped tradeoff function Q as well as the 
coordinates of the inflection point. The coordinate along the abscissa depends only on α and 
Β, whereas the coordinate along the ordinate depends also on the tradeoff parameter κ. As 
augmenting relative sensitivity vanishes, the inflection point goes to the origin, yielding a 
concave Q. As diminishing relative sensitivity vanishes, the inflection point goes to infinity, 
yielding a convex Q. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
------------------------------- 
Indifference data from choice-based matching 
Our second analysis is conducted on geometric means of δ, as reported by Scholten 
and Read (2006). The tradeoff model is specified as in Equation 7, the delay-perception 
function w as in Equation 10, and the tradeoff function Q as in Equation 11. However, the 
data provide no information about loss aversion, because outcomes were always gains, nor 
about diminishing sensitivity to outcomes, because the smaller-sooner gain was always of the 
same magnitude. The value function v can therefore be specified as v(x) = x while the tradeoff 
parameter κ can be held constant. 
In a choice-based matching study, participants were presented with nine pairs of 
delayed gains. For each option pair, they made an initial choice between a sooner gain of £500 
and a later gain that offered a simple interest of 100% per week. Most participants chose LL. 
The later gain was then adjusted in response to each of a series of choices until indifference 
between SS and LL was reached. The nine option pairs corresponded to the nine intervals 
displayed in Figure 8:  Six short intervals of 1 week, two medium-length intervals of 3 weeks, 
The Tradeoff Model of Intertemporal Choice 23 
and one long interval of 17 weeks. There was a medium-length interval at the beginning and 
end of the long interval. Each medium-length interval spanned three short intervals. The 
subintervals at the beginning and end of the long interval will hereafter be designated as 
‘early’ and ‘late’ intervals, respectively. The data revealed three major preference patterns: 
The delay effect, subadditivity, and superadditivity. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
------------------------------- 
As in the original analysis conducted by Scholten and Read (2006), we estimated four 
time-weighing parameters from nine data points. However, we estimated the parameters from 
one-period discount fractions (δ) rather than outcomes (xL). The results are given in Table 3. 
The parameter estimates of the tradeoff model confirmed the delay effect (τ), subadditivity 
(α), and superadditivity (Β). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
The tradeoff model, once estimated on δ, accounts for 84.35% of the variance of δ. 
Table 4 shows that, had the model been estimated on outcomes (xL), it would have accounted 
for only 75.45% of the variance of δ. Conversely, the tradeoff model, once estimated on xL, 
accounts for 99.78% of the variance of xL, but most of this variance, 98.69%, would also have 
been accounted for had the model been estimated on δ. Therefore, the improved accuracy with 
which we describe anomalies to the exponential-discounting model (i.e., systematic variations 
of δ) does not impair our ability to capture general discounting effects (in this study, the result 
that xL increases with tL - tS). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
Figure 9 displays the observed and predicted values of δ. The top panel shows that δ 
first decreases but then increases with interval length (superadditivity and subadditivity), 
while the bottom panel shows that it increases with the delay to interval onset (the delay 
effect). 
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------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 9 about here 
------------------------------- 
In sum, the tradeoff model accurately describes the co-occurrence of the delay effect, 
subadditivity, and superadditivity. Our next analysis examines the weighing of delays in 
combination with the weighing of outcomes. This analysis also extends the tradeoff model to 
states of equal or differential preference between SS and LL. To conduct this analysis, we 
need a value function that includes diminishing sensitivity to the outcomes and a tradeoff 
model that includes differential preference between the options. These are provided in the 
next two sections. 
The weighing of outcomes 
The value function v has the three properties that are familiar from prospect theory: 
Reference dependence, loss aversion, and diminishing sensitivity. Reference dependence and 
loss aversion were already specified in the first application of the tradeoff model. Diminishing 
sensitivity has two limits: Constant sensitivity, in which case the value of an outcome is equal 
to its monetary value and v becomes a scalar function, i.e., v(x) = x, and insensitivity, in which 
case any outcome is treated as if it had no value at all and v becomes a zero function, i.e., v(x) 
= 0 for any x. Reference dependence, loss aversion, and diminishing sensitivity are 
incorporated in the following value function: 
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where γ > 0 is a diminishing-sensitivity parameter.20 The value function becomes a scalar 
function, with constant sensitivity, as γ goes to zero and a zero function, with complete 
insensitivity, as γ goes toward infinity.21 
Within the theoretical structure of the tradeoff model, Equation 12 yields meaningful 
boundaries on the compensation demanded or offered for waiting. To illustrate, consider 
indifference between the following option pairs: 
(I)  x = $1 sooner and x + a = $11 later, 
(II) y = $100 sooner and y + a + e = $110 + e later. 
The compensation demanded is a = $10 in I and a + e = $10 + e in II. According to Equation 
12, a + e cannot be smaller than $10 (constant compensation) or larger than $1,000 
(proportional compensation). That is, a ≤ a + e ≤ a · y/x. These boundaries are obtained by 
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solving Equation 6 for a + e, specifying v as in Equation 12, and letting γ go to zero and 
infinity, respectively. 
Preference data 
We generalize the tradeoff model to states of indifference or preference by applying 
Restle’s (1961) binary-choice model. The odds of choosing LL among a pair of gains or SS 
among a pair of losses can be given as 
ϑ






=
−
=Ω ),(
),(
1 SL
SL
ttf
xxg
P
P
,                                          (13) 
where 0 < P < 1 is the probability of choosing LL among a pair of gains or SS among a pair of 
losses and ϑ ≥ 0 is the degree of determinism in choice behavior: The higher ϑ, the higher the 
odds that the option favored by the tradeoff will be chosen. For indifference data, Ω = 1 for all 
option pairs, so that Equation 13 reduces to Equation 1. 
Below, we conduct a choice-based matching study that yields preference data as well 
as indifference data. This allows us to cross-validate our model by estimating its parameters 
from the indifference data and then applying those estimates to the preference data, or vice 
versa. 
Indifference and preference data from choice-based matching 
Participants. The participants were 34 students (nine females and 25 males) from the 
London School of Economics and 18 students (15 females and three males) from the Instituto 
Superior de Psicologia Aplicada in Lisbon. The participants from London were paid £5, those 
from Lisbon received €7.50. 
Design. The design was composed of three within-participant factors: The delay to the 
outcomes (standard, additively increased, or multiplicatively increased), the magnitude of the 
outcomes (small or large), and their sign (positive or negative). Orthogonal manipulation of 
these factors yielded 12 option pairs, which are displayed in Table 5.1. The presentation order 
of these pairs was randomized across participants. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5.1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Procedure. Experimental sessions were run by computer, which, for each option pair, 
involved an adjustment procedure. On the first trial, participants chose from a pair of delayed 
outcomes as displayed in Table 5.1. The delays were then fixed, as was the outcome not 
chosen on the first trial. On subsequent trials, the outcome chosen on the first trial was 
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adjusted. The adjustment procedure followed that described by Scholten and Read (2006, 
Appendix). 
Preference data. For each option pair, P was taken to be the proportion of participants 
who chose LL (gains) or SS (losses) on the first trial. These choice proportions are given in 
Table 5.1. 
Indifference data. For each option pair and each participant, the indifference-inducing 
outcome, xS or xL, was taken to be the midpoint between the values of the variable outcome on 
the last two trials. We then computed aggregate values of xS and xL across fixed and variable 
outcomes. These values, and those of δ, are given in Table 5.2. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5.2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Results. The data revealed four major preference patterns: The magnitude effect, the 
sign effect, the delay effect, and subadditivity. Consistent with other studies using intervals of 
at least several months (Baron, 2000; Read, 2001; Read & Roelofsma, 2003), there was no 
indication of superadditivity. The tradeoff model was specified as in Equation 7, the delay-
perception function w as in Equation 10, the tradeoff function Q as in Equation 11 with Β = 1, 
and the value function v as in Equation 12. Thus, we estimated five parameters from 12 data 
points (one-period discount fractions). The results are given in Table 6. The parameter 
estimates of the tradeoff model confirmed the sign effect (Λ), the delay effect (τ), and 
subadditivity (α). The magnitude effect, generated by intra-attribute subtractivity, was 
attenuated by diminishing sensitivity (γ). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------- 
Figure 10 displays the observed and predicted values of δ. The top panel shows that δ 
increases when the delays increase by the same additive constant (the delay effect) or by the 
same multiplicative constant (a shared implication of the delay effect and subadditivity). 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 10 about here 
--------------------------------- 
The top panel also shows that δ is higher for multiplicatively increased delays than for 
additively increased delays. This indicates that subadditivity outweighs the delay effect. To 
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verify this, we divide the interval 12 → 36 (demarcated by the multiplicatively increased 
delays and denoted U) into an early interval 12 → 23 (denoted E), an intermediate interval 23 
→ 29 (demarcated by the additively increased delays and denoted M), and a late interval 29 
→ 36 (denoted L). The delay effect implies that δ will be higher for M than for U, because the 
interval E preceding M is longer than the interval L succeeding M, i.e., M occurs toward the 
end of U.22 Subadditivity has the opposite implication, because M is shorter than U. We verify 
that δ is higher for U than for M, indicating that subadditivity outweighed the delay effect. 
The bottom panel of Figure 10 shows that δ is higher for large outcomes than for small 
ones (the magnitude effect) and that δ is higher for losses than for gains (the sign effect). In 
addition, the magnitude effect is greater for gains than for losses. This confirms the magnitude 
by sign interaction effect previously identified by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). 
We evaluated the goodness-of-fit of the tradeoff model to the one-period discount 
fractions, outcomes, and choice odds, after we estimated it on each of these dependent 
variables.23 The results are given in Table 7. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------- 
Estimating the parameters from one data set and then applying those estimates to the 
other obviously detracted from the goodness-of-fit, but the tradeoff model stood up well in the 
cross-validation. Inspection of the left and right panel of Figure 11 reveals that the detraction 
from goodness-of-fit was caused primarily by the overall levels of discounting that were 
predicted: Model estimation on choice odds yielded one-period discount fractions that were 
generally too low (i.e., too much discounting; see the left panel), whereas model estimation on 
one-period discount fractions or outcomes yielded choice odds that were generally too high 
(i.e., too little discounting; see the right panel). This seems to suggest that people are more 
impulsive in choice than in choice-based matching, which is quite intuitive. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 11 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Pruning 
We earlier mentioned that the comparison of the options under consideration may be 
more or less cursory. The more careful assessments are the psychophysical ones just 
described, and the more cursory assessments are procedural ones, as described in this section. 
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We propose that the psychophysical model applies when there is a meaningful tradeoff 
between the timing and the desirability or undesirability of the outcomes. We also propose, 
however, that, when there is either no tradeoff or such a trivial one that a careful weighing of 
relative advantages is unnecessary, decision makers use low-effort heuristics, which we call 
pruning operations. 
One pruning operation is elimination of dominated options (EDO): If X is better than Y 
along one attribute, and no worse along the other, then choose X. EDO is used when there is 
no tradeoff between delay and outcome, e.g., when the choice is between a smaller-later (SL) 
outcome and a larger-sooner (LS) one. EDO is called detection of dominance in prospect 
theory and corresponds to Stage I of Rubinstein’s (2003) similarity model of intertemporal 
choice. 
The other pruning operation is elimination of nearly-dominated options (ENO): If X is 
better than Y along one attribute, and only trivially worse along the other, then choose X. ENO 
is used when there is a tradeoff between delay and outcome, i.e., a choice between SS and LL, 
but the difference between the options along one attribute is ‘negligible’ and therefore pruned 
away. Take, for instance, the following options: 
X = ($150, 2 months), 
Y = ($151, 24 months). 
For most people, the additional gain of $1 is ‘negligible,’ but the additional wait of 22 months 
is not. The outcome difference is therefore pruned away and the smaller-sooner outcome is 
chosen. ENO corresponds to one of the simplification procedures in prospect theory, called 
elimination of small differences between prospects, and to Stage II of Rubinstein’s (2003) 
similarity model of intertemporal choice. 
EDO and EDO are used when choice is ‘obvious.’ Both operations are fast and free of 
doubt. Indeed, the moment one starts to wonder whether an attribute difference is negligible 
or not, one has stopped pruning, and choice has been passed on to a more careful weighing of 
relative advantages. 
ENO distinguishes itself from both EDO and the more careful weighing of relative 
advantages by a high degree of inter-attribute sensitivity: Whether the difference along an 
attribute is considered to be negligible or not depends to a high degree on the difference along 
the other attribute. Take, for instance, the following options: 
X = ($151, 2 months), 
Y’ = ($150, 24 months), 
Z’ = ($150, 2 months and 1 day). 
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X dominates both Y’ and Z’. Therefore, the choice between X and Y’ is as obvious as the 
choice between X and Z’. Now consider the following options: 
X = ($150, 2 months), 
Y = ($151, 24 months), 
Z = ($151, 2 months and 1 day). 
The attribute differences are exactly the same as in the previous example, but this time X 
implies a tradeoff with both Y and Z. When X is compared with Y, only one of the two 
attribute differences is small and therefore likely to be pruned away. However, when X is 
compared with Z, both attribute differences are small, so that neither is likely to be pruned 
away. Thus, ENO will not dictate whether to choose X or Z, and choice is passed on to the 
tradeoff process described by the psychophysical model. 
General Discussion 
Research on intertemporal judgments and choices between a smaller-sooner and a 
larger-later outcome has revealed many preference patterns that are anomalies to the 
discounted-utility model, the economic standard for rational intertemporal choices. Attempts 
to account for these anomalies within the discounting paradigm have resulted in convoluted 
and psychologically opaque models. We developed a new model of intertemporal choice, the 
tradeoff model, in which choice results from a tradeoff between the perceived time difference 
(interval) and the perceived outcome difference (compensation). This model is both more 
parsimonious and more intuitive than any rival discounting model of comparable scope. 
Moreover, it accurately describes archival data as well as data from a new experiment. 
In this final section, we discuss the relation between the tradeoff model and other 
models of choice based on tradeoffs between attribute differences, the relation between the 
tradeoff model and bilinear choice models, and the scope of the tradeoff model within the 
domain of intertemporal choice. 
Tradeoffs and choice 
The tradeoff model draws a distinction between more cursory, procedural assessments 
of the options and more careful, psychophysical assessments. When there is either no tradeoff 
or such a trivial one that a careful weighing of relative advantages is unnecessary, choice is 
based on low-effort pruning operations: Elimination of dominated and nearly-dominated 
options. These operations correspond to Stage I and Stage II, respectively, of Rubinstein’s 
(2003) procedural approach to intertemporal choice (see also Leland, 2002). “If,” according to 
Rubinstein (2003), “the two first stages were not decisive, the choice is made using a different 
criterion.” (p. 1210) The psychophysics of the tradeoff model is a possible description of the 
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‘different criterion’ used in Stage III. Our description of Stage III is a natural continuation of 
Stages I and II, in that each of the three stages is a form of attribute-based choice. 
The formal modeling of attribute-based choice processes, pioneered by Restle (1961) 
and Tversky (1969), has recently seen a growing interest. Recent developments include 
stochastic models that predict probabilities of choice from a set of two (González-Vallejo, 
2002; González-Vallejo & Reid, 2006) or three options (Kivetz, Netzer, & Srinivasan, 2004a, 
2004b; Scholten, 2002; Tversky & Simonson, 1993), as well as stochastic-dynamic models 
that also predict latencies of choice from a set of two (Diederich, 1997) or three options (Roe, 
Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001; Usher & McClelland, 2004). All of these modeling attempts, 
however, address either risky choice or choice between consumer products. The tradeoff 
model is the first to broaden the scope of attribute-based choice modeling to intertemporal 
choice. 
The tradeoff model is a stochastic model of choice between two options and is 
therefore most directly comparable to the stochastic-difference model of González-Vallejo 
(2002; González-Vallejo & Reid, 2006). As applied to the intertemporal choices addressed by 
the tradeoff model, the stochastic-difference model suggests that indifference between SS and 
LL arises when 
εψ =+− ))(),(())(),(( LSLS twtwHxvxvH , 
where ψ  is a decision threshold and ε is a random error. When ψ  > 0, there is a bias in favor 
of LL (gains) or SS (losses); when ψ  < 0, there is a bias against these options. The tradeoff 
function H translates the attributes into a common currency.24 González-Vallejo (2002) 
proposes that the tradeoff function H is the proportional difference between its arguments: 
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Because the same tradeoff function H applies to perceived outcomes and perceived 
delays, there are not many alternatives to defining it as a proportional-difference function. 
This, however, invites most of the problems that we have identified for Scholten and Read’s 
(2006) interval-discounting model. Most importantly, it must invoke two elasticity properties 
for v, i.e., increasing the magnitude of the outcomes by the same multiplicative constant or 
changing their sign from positive to negative decreases the ratio v(xS) / v(xL), and, on top of 
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this, an elasticity property for w, i.e., increasing the delays by the same multiplicative constant 
decreases the ratio w(tS) / w(tL). A key distinction between González-Vallejo’s (2002) and our 
model is that the stochastic-difference model takes the proportional-difference rule as the 
process within which elasticity operates, whereas the tradeoff model takes an absolute-
difference rule as the process within which diminishing sensitivity operates. We have argued 
that our proposal is both more parsimonious and more intuitive as a description of preference 
patterns in intertemporal choice. 
So much for tradeoffs? 
Discounting models belong to the general class of bilinear choice models, in which the 
value of an outcome is multiplied by a weight corresponding to its delay or probability. Thus, 
the immediacy equivalent of a delayed outcome is: 
xS = v
-1[d(tL)v(xL)]. 
The certainty equivalent of a risky outcome can be described analogously (see Birnbaum & 
Sutton, 1992). The multiplicative operation implies that, if we plot the immediacy equivalent 
against the delayed outcome, we will obtain a diverging fan of lines, with a steeper slope 
corresponding to a shorter delay. This has generally been confirmed for delayed outcomes 
(Stevenson, 1986, 1992, 1993) as well as, analogously, risky ones (Anderson & Shanteau, 
1970; Shanteau, 1974; Tversky, 1967a, 1967b). The tradeoff model, however, describes the 
immediacy equivalent as: 
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The subtraction or addition will not produce the diverging fan unless v-1 includes an 
exponential function of its argument. The inverse of the generalized logarithmic function in 
Equation 12 meets this requirement. Consider, for instance, the 12 × 2 = 24 options in Table 
5.2. Let tj and xj denote the delay and outcome, respectively, of option j and let jyˆ  denote the 
immediacy equivalent of option j as estimated by the tradeoff model. Thus, 
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For each delayed outcome, we obtain the immediacy equivalent by specifying w, Q, and v as 
in Equations 10, 11, and 12, respectively, and employing the parameter estimates from Table 
6. The results are displayed in Figure 12. The diverging fan of lines is obvious, both for losses 
(left panel) and for gains (right panel). Thus, the evidence for a ‘multiplicative operation,’ 
sometimes treated as evidence against attribute-based choice models (e.g., Stevenson, 1992), 
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is fully compatible with the tradeoff model. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 12 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Control in intertemporal choice 
The tradeoff model addresses intertemporal judgments and choices that involve a 
comparison between a smaller amount of money after a smaller amount of time (SS) and a 
larger amount of money after a larger amount of time (LL). Although this has been the focus 
of most experimentation on, and formal modeling of, individual intertemporal choices, it is 
nonetheless a narrow focus. For instance, we have not extended the tradeoff model to choices 
between sequences of outcomes (e.g., Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991, 1993), the modeling of 
which will require yet more psychological apparatus, possibly the operation of multiple 
reference points and other forms of intra-attribute sensitivity. But even the domain of 
intertemporal choices between SS and LL is not exhaustively described by our model. Rather, 
we suggest there is a continuum of choices ranging from ‘uncontrolled’ to ‘rationally 
controlled,’ with ‘intuitively controlled’ choices, as described by our model, falling in 
between. This is depicted in Figure 13. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 13 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Uncontrolled choices are the ‘poster children’ of intertemporal choices. Examples 
include choosing whether to have the tiramisu, to smoke another cigarette, or to engage in 
unprotected or forbidden sex. The person is hardly a decision maker any longer, but rather a 
servant of uncontrollable fears and desires (Loewenstein, 1996, 2000). These choices cannot 
easily be viewed as deliberate tradeoffs between SS and LL. Sometimes, LL cannot even be 
conceived as such (e.g., how is using a condom an LL in comparison with not using one?), 
and may thus not enter into the decision. Sometimes, of course, and normally as the result of a 
prior decision, people may struggle with their desires by making the tradeoff explicit to 
themselves (e.g., ‘is the pleasure of this dessert worth the extra time I will have to spend in the 
gym to burn off the calories?’), but these are rare occasions, and even on these occasions the 
pull of the present pleasure is so great that we doubt whether any additional insight will come 
from modeling it as a variant of the g-function in the tradeoff model. 
Rationally controlled choices are at the other end of the spectrum. These are made 
through formal reasoning. In the introduction, we described two ways in which a person could 
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choose between delayed outcomes: Either by directly comparing the options along the time 
attribute and the money attribute, as described by the tradeoff model, or by first computing 
and then comparing discounted values. Someone who does the latter is rationally controlled. 
We expect, or rather hope, that the intertemporal choices made by a new Harvard MBA, when 
at work (i.e., not when cruising the night clubs or making personal investment decisions), can 
be formally modeled as the maximization of discounted value. 
Intuitively controlled choices, addressed by the tradeoff model, fall in between these 
two ends of the continuum. These choices are controlled, because the person is not enslaved 
by unbridled passion, and therefore has the capacity to deliberate and to choose the option that 
reason commands. But the control is intuitive, because the person is not an agent that acts as if 
informed by tables of interest rates and discounted values. Rather, an explicit tradeoff is made 
between the timing and the desirability or undesirability of the outcomes. The questions that 
first come to mind are ‘how much sooner?’ and ‘how much smaller?,’ or ‘how much later?’ 
and ‘how much larger?’ The answers are assessments similar to those that would be made 
when assessing any quantity such as loudness (‘how much louder?’) or brightness (‘how 
much brighter?’). The question then becomes how much weight should be given to the 
perceived time difference relative to the perceived outcome difference. It is this intuitive 
process that we have modeled in this paper. 
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TABLE 1 
Comparison of the interval-discounting model and the tradeoff model. 
Interval-discounting model Tradeoff model 
Interval discounting Intra-attribute subtractivity 
Increasing proportional sensitivity  
Loss amplification  
Loss aversion Loss aversion 
Complete adaptation to rescheduled outcomes Adaptation to rescheduled outcomes 
Diminishing sensitivity Diminishing sensitivity 
Superadditive discounting (short intervals) Augmenting relative sensitivity (short intervals) 
Subadditive discounting (medium to long intervals) Diminishing relative sensitivity (medium to long intervals) 
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TABLE 2 
Data from Benzion et al. (1989): Magnitude of the rescheduled outcome, delay to the later outcome, goodness-of-fit to one-period discount coefficients 
and parameter estimates of the tradeoff model, and hypothesis tests.a 
100% × R2 = 91.02% 
Magnitude 
dependenceb 
Delay 
dependencec R 
Incomplete 
adaptationd 
Asymmetric 
adaptatione 
Loss 
aversionf 
Magnitude of 
rescheduled 
outcome 
Delay to 
later 
outcome κ t(39) p t(39) p Gains Losses t(39) p t(39) p Λ t(39) p 
40 ½ 16.33 - - - - 
40 1 10.95 - - -6.56 .00 
40 2 8.11 - - -3.51 .00 
40 4 5.61 - - -3.52 .00 
20.06 -4.95 -3.04 .00 2.28 .01 
200 ½ 60.63 13.23  .00 - - 
200 1 40.57 8.58 .00 -4.37 .00 
200 2 33.54 8.16 .00 -1.56 .06 
200 4 25.20 7.67 .00 -2.13 .02 
67.86 -5.46 -5.33 .00 2.10 .02 
1.14 3.15 .00 
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1,000 ½ 272.53 12.30  .00 - - 
1,000 1 196.54 8.89 .00 -3.24 .00 
1,000 2 150.28 7.08 .00 -1.99 .03 
1,000 4 124.67 7.61 .00 -1.26 .11 
400.32 -72.54 -4.20 .00 2.11 .02 
5,000 ½ 919.57 7.29 .00 - - 
5,000 1 730.30 5.96 .00 -1.55 .06 
5,000 2 588.66 5.10 .00 -1.17 .12 
5,000 4 488.64 4.86 .00 -0.90 .19 
511.52 -971.29 -8.36 .00 -0.80 .79 
aThe tradeoff model was estimated on 64 data points (r) collected from 204 participants. Tests are one-tailed t-tests. 
bTesting whether κ increases reliably when the magnitude of the rescheduled outcome increases (e.g., from $1,000 to $5,000), holding the delay to the later 
outcome constant. 
cTesting whether κ decreases reliably when the delay to the later outcome increases (e.g., from 2 yr to 4 yr), holding the magnitude of the rescheduled 
outcome constant. 
dTesting whether the highest level of adaptation is reliably lower than the level of complete adaptation (e.g., whether a positive reference-point shift of 
$400.32 is reliably smaller than a full shift of $1,000 or whether a negative reference-point shift of $971.29 is reliably smaller than a full shift of $5,000). 
eTesting whether the level of adaptation to a gain is reliably higher than the level of adaptation to a loss (e.g., whether a positive reference-point shift of 
$400.32 is reliably greater than a negative shift of $72.54). 
fTesting whether Λ is reliably greater than one. 
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TABLE 3 
Data from Scholten and Read (2006): Goodness-of-
fit to one-period discount fractions and parameter 
estimates of the tradeoff model.a 
100% × R2 = 84.35% 
Parameter Estimate t(5) p 
κ  104.76 2.08b .05 
α  0.51 0.86b .21 
Β  1.68 2.79c .02 
τ  0.03 2.44b .03 
aThe tradeoff model was estimated on nine data points (logarithmic transforms of δ) collected 
from 42 participants. 
bTesting whether the estimate is reliably greater than zero (one-tailed t-test). 
cTesting whether the estimate is reliably greater than one (one-tailed t-test). 
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TABLE 4 
Data from Scholten and Read (2006): Fitting and 
cross-fitting the tradeoff model to one-period 
discount fractions and outcomes (100% × R2).a 
Tradeoff model 
evaluated on Tradeoff model 
estimated on δ xL 
δ 84.35 98.69 
xL 75.46 99.78 
aThe tradeoff model was estimated and evaluated on logarithmic transforms of the dependent 
variables. 
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TABLE 5.1 
Preference data from choice-based matching study: Delays, 
outcomes, and choice probabilities. 
tS
a
 tL
a
 xS
b
 xL
b
 P c Pˆ d 
3 9 20 40 .481 .439 
3 9 -20 -40 .731 .728 
3 9 200 400 .712 .629 
3 9 -200 -400 .769 .853 
23 29 20 40 .750 .783 
23 29 -20 -40 .904 .925 
23 29 200 400 .865 .887 
23 29 -200 -400 .981 .964 
12 36 20 40 .269 .301 
12 36 -20 -40 .692 .596 
12 36 200 400 .481 .483 
12 36 -200 -400 .712 .762 
aDelays in months. 
bOutcomes in pounds or euros. 
cRelative frequencies (N = 52). 
dPredictions from the tradeoff model. 
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TABLE 5.2 
Indifference data from choice-based matching study: Delays, 
outcomes, and one-period discount fractions. 
tS
a
 tL
a
 xS
b,c
 xL
b,c
 
δ c δˆ d 
3 9 15.94 33.11 .885 .885 
3 9 -29.27 -44.45 .933 .933 
3 9 184.72 296.61 .924 .921 
3 9 -301.87 -430.45 .943 .948 
23 29 19.19 29.00 .934 .934 
23 29 -32.27 -40.62 .962 .961 
23 29 191.52 261.15 .950 .954 
23 29 -345.80 -400.95 .976 .970 
12 36 13.55 36.46 .960 .961 
12 36 -28.79 -44.26 .982 .978 
12 36 176.18 331.57 .974 .974 
12 36 -282.65 -445.06 .981 .983 
aDelays in months. 
bOutcomes in pounds or euros. 
cGeometric means (N = 52). 
dPredictions from the tradeoff model. 
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TABLE 6 
Data from choice-based matching study: Goodness-
of-fit to one-period discount fractions and parameter 
estimates of the tradeoff model.a 
100% × R2 = 98.80% 
Parameter Estimate t(7) p 
κ  4.58 2.11b .04 
α  1.24 1.39b .10 
τ  0.16 2.41b .02 
γ  0.08 6.19b .00 
Λ  1.52 6.83c .00 
aThe tradeoff model was estimated on 12 data points (logarithmic transforms of δ) collected 
from 52 participants. 
bTesting whether the estimate is reliably greater than zero (one-tailed t-test). 
cTesting whether the estimate is reliably greater than one (one-tailed t-test). 
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TABLE 7 
Data from choice-based matching study: Fitting and cross-fitting the tradeoff 
model to one-period discount fractions, outcomes, and choice odds (100% × 
R2).a 
Tradeoff model 
evaluated on Tradeoff model 
estimated on δ xL Ωc 
δ 98.80 99.89 84.44 
xL 98.56 99.90 82.99 
Ωb 91.96 99.65 91.62 
aThe tradeoff model was estimated and evaluated on logarithmic transforms of the dependent 
variables. 
bThe tradeoff model was estimated on log choice odds by minimizing a weighted least-
squares loss function (see Maddala, 1994, pp. 28-32), in which the squared deviations 
between observed and predicted log choice odds were weighted by 
)1( PNPw −= . 
Minimizing an ordinary least-squares loss function (w = 1 for all option pairs) led to very 
similar results. 
cϑ = 2.81. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Examples of the value function from prospect theory (dashed curves) and the value 
function proposed by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992; solid curves). The two value functions 
are scaled such that they cross at the edge of the graph. 
Figure 2. Postponing a gain: The valuation of outcomes in case of no adaptation (top left 
panel), complete adaptation (top right panel), and incomplete adaptation (bottom panel) to the 
postponed outcome. The greater the adaptation to that outcome, the greater the compensation 
demanded for postponing it. 
Figure 3. Applying the tradeoff model to the data from Benzion et al. (1989): The top panel 
shows the estimated values of R, confirming incomplete and asymmetric adaptation; the 
bottom panel shows the estimated values of κ, confirming magnitude and sign dependence. 
Outcomes are in dollars, delays are in years. 
Figure 4. Observed values of ρ (left) from Benzion et al. (1989) and predicted values (right) 
from the tradeoff model. The top panel pools across 4 (outcome magnitude) × 4 (delay to the 
later outcome) = 16 data points, showing the rescheduling effect and the sign effect. The 
bottom panel pools across 2 (postponing versus preponing an outcome) × 2 (outcome sign) = 
4 data points, showing the magnitude effect and the pseudo-delay effect. Outcomes are in 
dollars, delays are in years. 
Figure 5. Observed values of ρ (left) from Benzion et al. (1989) and predicted values (right) 
from the tradeoff model for $5,000 outcomes, pooled across four delays to the later outcome. 
Figure 6. Four variants of the tradeoff function Q, showing constant relative sensitivity (linear 
function; α → 0 and Β = 1), augmenting relative sensitivity (convex function; α → 0), 
diminishing relative sensitivity (concave function; Β = 1), and a sequence of augmenting and 
diminishing relative sensitivity (S-shaped function). 
Figure 7. The inflection point of the tradeoff function Q. 
Figure 8. The nine intervals used by Scholten and Read (2006). 
Figure 9. Observed values of δ (solid curves) from Scholten and Read (2006) and predicted 
values (dashed curves) from the tradeoff model. The top panel pools across the six short 
intervals and across the two medium-length intervals, showing superadditivity and 
subadditivity. The bottom panel pools across the four early intervals and across the four late 
intervals (in either case, three short intervals and one medium-length interval), showing the 
delay effect. Observed and predicted values of δ displayed on a logarithmic scale. 
Figure 10. Observed values of δ (solid curves) from the choice-based matching study and 
predicted values (dashed curves) from the tradeoff model. The top panel pools across the four 
outcome conditions, showing the delay effect and strong subadditivity. The bottom panel 
pools across the three delay conditions, showing the magnitude effect, the sign effect, and 
their interaction. Observed and predicted values of δ displayed on a logarithmic scale. 
Figure 11. Choice-based matching study: Observed and predicted values of the dependent 
variables, displayed on a logarithmic scale. 
Figure 12.  Indifference data from the choice-based matching study: Estimated immediacy 
equivalents of the 24 delayed outcomes. Outcomes are in pounds or euros, delays are in 
months. 
Figure 13. Control in intertemporal choice. 
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FIG. 11 
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FIG. 13 
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Endnotes 
 
1Analogous distinctions have been made between independent and comparative evaluation 
(Tversky, 1969), interdimensional and intradimensional processing (Payne, 1976), holistic 
and dimensional choice strategies (Russo & Dosher, 1983) and separate and joint evaluation 
(Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999). 
2We thus associate the term ‘tradeoff’ with attribute-based choice (González-Vallejo, 2002) 
rather than alternative-based choice (Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2006). 
3The exponential-discounting model is not equivalent to Samuelson’s (1937) discounted-
utility model. According to the discounted-utility model, indifference between SS and LL 
arises when )()()()( LtttSt xcucucuxcu LSLS ++=++ δδδδ , where c is a constant baseline 
consumption level and u is a concave utility function over consumption levels. Thus, apart 
from the exponential discounting, the models are quite different with respect to the evaluation 
of outcomes: The exponential-discounting model effectively assumes that u is a linear utility 
function over deviations from the constant baseline consumption level. 
4The normative status of exponential discounting arises because only constant discounting 
ensures that preferences will not change merely due to the passage of time (Strotz, 1955-
1956). The exponential-discounting model, however, assumes exponential discounting of 
outcomes, rather than outcome utilities, so that variation of δ does not necessarily disprove the 
constant discounting as prescribed by the discounted-utility model (see also Frederick, 
Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002). Although the discounted-utility model may account for 
some variation of δ, it often fails on closer scrutiny (see Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992) and it 
certainly fails to account for all variation of δ that has proven reliable across studies. 
5Not counting the studies in which the effect of the delay to outcomes is confounded with that 
of the interval between outcomes (see Read, 2001), the delay effect is seen in some (Green, 
Fristoe, & Myerson, 1994; Green, Myerson, & Macaux, 2005; Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; 
Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995; Scholten & Read, 2006), but not, or not reliably, in others 
(Ahlbrecht & Weber, 1997; Baron, 2000; Holcomb & Nelson, 1992; Read, 2001; Read & 
Roelofsma, 2003). The delay effect has been confirmed in studies where time periods were 
presented as delays proper (e.g., “in 1 year”) and disconfirmed mostly in studies where time 
periods were presented as dates (e.g., “on December 1, 2007”). Recent studies show that using 
dates instead of delays indeed attenuates or eliminates the delay effect (LeBoeuf, 2006; Read, 
Frederick, Orsel, & Rahman, 2005). 
6The paper by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) contains a typographical error, in that their 
Inequality 18 reads ‘<’ instead of ‘>’. However, the surrounding text is correct (see also 
Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991; but see al-Nowaihi & Dhami, 2006, for a different reading). 
7Because of diminishing sensitivity, both percentages are smaller than 10. 
8Not counting the studies in which the effect of the sign of an outcome is confounded with 
that of the rescheduling of an outcome (see Shelley, 1993), the sign effect is seen in some 
(Murphy, Vuchinich, & Simpson, 2001; Yates & Watts, 1975), but not, or not reliably, in 
others (Ahlbrecht & Weber, 1997; Benzion, Yagil, & Rapoport, 1989; Loewenstein, 1987; 
Shelley, 1993). 
9Thaler (1981) originally ascribed the sign effect to loss aversion. However, a discounting 
model does not generate a sign effect on the basis of loss aversion alone, only in interaction 
with diminishing sensitivity. Therefore, he probably thought of loss amplification rather than 
loss aversion. 
10The word ‘preponing’ is Indian English for ‘bringing forward in time.’ The former may be 
awkward to Anglo-American readers, but it is more concise than the latter, and it may also be 
 
The Tradeoff Model of Intertemporal Choice 62 
 
less confusing to non-native speakers. 
11See also Hoch and Loewenstein (1991, Figure 1), Loewenstein (1988, Figures 1, 2, and 3), 
Shelley, 1993, Figure 1), and Strahilevitz and Loewenstein (1998, Figures 1a and 1b). 
12The expression that “the subjective magnitude of outcomes increases with their objective 
magnitude” also applies to losses: Greater losses correspond to lower values of x and smaller 
losses correspond to higher values of x, so that v´(x) > 0. 
13We use the Hooke-Jeeves and Quasi-Newton routine of the Statistica software (StatSoft, 
2003) for model estimation. 
14We use the term ‘discounting’ merely to describe empirical regularities in a data set, without 
intending any reference to a psychological process. 
15This procedure thus avoids the problem, discussed by Kirby (1997), that the arithmetic 
mean of individual discount rates is not the same as an aggregate discount rate computed 
from the arithmetic mean of the variable outcome. 
16Because of the delay-interval confound, the present analysis cannot distinguish between 
diminishing sensitivity to delays and diminishing relative sensitivity to perceived intervals. 
17This is different for the variation of R, which we expect to confirm incomplete and 
asymmetric adaptation, but may otherwise not exhibit an orderly pattern. Indeed, the prime 
motive for this first application of the tradeoff model is to explore the variation of R. 
18A linear value function has also been adopted in earlier examinations of the rescheduling 
effect (Loewenstein, 1988; Shelley, 1993; see also Hoch & Loewenstein, 1991). 
19We could not include the data collected by Shelley (1993) in our analysis, because she did 
not report the discount coefficients from all 96 cells in her design. There were 32 more cells 
than in the design of Benzion et al. (1989), because she added a ‘neutral’ condition to the 
rescheduling factor. In this condition, Equation 4 should reduce to Equation 3, which only 
predicts a sign effect, i.e., lower discount coefficients for losses than for gains. However, the 
wording of the matching task in this condition was far from neutral: “You owe a debt of $40 
in four years to a public institute. What is the (negative) value, -$x, of that debt to you now?” 
(Shelley, 1993, Figure 2). This can easily be ‘misinterpreted’ as rescheduling a commitment, 
especially in the context of more explicit wordings to that effect. Actually, the data from the 
‘neutral’ condition revealed higher discount coefficients for losses than for gains (Shelley, 
1993, Figures 3 and 6), suggesting that an undesired rescheduling effect still outweighed the 
sign effect. 
20Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) value function has two diminishing-sensitivity parameters, 
one for gains and one for losses, thus allowing for different degrees of diminishing sensitivity 
to gains and losses. Equation 12 has only one diminishing-sensitivity parameter γ and captures 
any differential sensitivity to gains and losses with the loss-aversion parameter Λ. 
21Formal choice models often assume a power value function (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992), rather than a logarithmic one. The power analogue of Equation 12 is: 
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which becomes a scalar function when γ = 0 and a zero function as γ goes toward infinity. The 
power function has a greater complexity than the logarithmic function, i.e., a greater capacity 
to fit data, but the logarithmic function seems to have a greater generalizability than the power 
function, i.e., a greater capacity to account for data to which it was not fitted (see Pitt, Myung, 
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& Zhang, 2002). 
22Most models that account for the delay effect, including the tradeoff model, imply that δ will 
be higher for M than for U even if E is as long as L, because δ increases by a greater 
proportion from E to M than from M to L, i.e., δM / δE > δL / δM or δM > LEδδ . 
23Applying a preference model to choice odds has the same problem as applying an 
indifference model to outcomes: An overly naïve null model. For instance, if one is equally 
likely to choose $5 now or $10 after 1 period of time, one would be more likely to choose $95 
now than $100 after that period and more likely to choose $5 now than $10 after 2 periods, 
but the null model would assign equal probabilities throughout. 
24González-Vallejo (2002) denotes H as d and ψ as δ, which in this paper represent a discount 
factor and a one-period discount fraction, respectively. 
